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About the Working Paper Series 
This article is one in a series of papers addressing one or more issues of critical 
importance to the acquisition profession.  A working paper is a forum to accomplish a 
variety of objectives, such as: (1) present a rough draft of a particular piece of 
acquisition research, (2) structure a “white paper” to present opinion or reasoning, (3) 
put down one’s thoughts in a “think piece” for collegial review, (4) present a preliminary 
draft of an eventual article in an acquisition periodical, (5) provide a tutorial (such as a 
technical note) to accompany a case study, and (6) develop a dialogue among 
practitioners and researchers that encourages debate and discussion on topics of 
mutual importance.   A working paper is generally the “internal” outlet for academic and 
research institutions to cultivate an idea, argument or hypothesis, particularly when in its 
infant stages.  The primary intent is to induce critical thinking about crucial acquisition 
issues/problems that will become part of the acquisition professional body of 
knowledge.  
It is expected that articles in the working paper series will eventually be published 
in other venues, such as in refereed journals and other periodicals, as technical reports, 
as chapters in a book, as cases or case studies, as monographs, or as a variety of other 
similar publications. 
Readers are encouraged to provide both written and oral feedback to working- 
paper authors.  Through rigorous discussion and discourse, it is anticipated that 
underlying assumptions, concepts, conventional wisdom, theories and principles will be 
challenged, examined and articulated.
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Abstract 
Contingency efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and several other countries in the last 
few years have been subjected to close scrutiny and critique.  Contingency Contracting 
operations are increasingly the major source of support and provisioning in forward 
theaters, especially in light of reductions in organic (non-contracted) support 
capabilities. Recently, theater combatant commanders have come to rely on 
contingency contracting officers to support coalition forces, and concurrently, to achieve 
a transformation of the economic landscape essential for achieving theater objectives.  
But, critics of recent operations cite deficiencies in DoD’s ability to effectively and 
efficiently conduct a coordinated contracting support effort that integrates the combatant 
commander’s theater objectives with the myriad stakeholders deemed essential for 
success.  Can we, the military, achieve better results?  The author contends that with 
proper understanding of integrated planning and execution, contingency contracting 
operations can, and will, provide significant leverage for achieving the combatant 
commander’s objectives.   
The author formally presented, on August 7th, 2003, a Yoder three-tier model for 
contingency contracting operations to the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School.1 
Subsequent to the NPS faculty presentation, the author published a synoptic “interest” 
article in the Army AL&T Magazine’s January-February 2004 edition, entitled, 
“Contingency Contracting Operations—Achieving Better Results.2  
Because of continued interest in the Yoder three-tier model expressed by 
academics, force planners, and contracting offices from several agencies, the author 
believes a more comprehensive write-up of the Yoder three-tier model is appropriate.  
The NPS working paper series provides the in-depth coverage, broad dissemination 
and recognized avenue for open dialogue of the model and its potential efficacy.    
                                            
1 E. Cory Yoder, “Contingency Contracting—Achieving Better Results.” NPS slide show, 2003. 
2 E. Cory Yoder, “Contingency Contracting Operations—Achieving Better Results,” Army AL&T Magazine 
PB 70-04-01, (January-February 2004): 95-97.   
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As such, this working paper proposes the Yoder three-tier contingency 
contracting officer model structure for Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force support 
of theater contingency contracting operations.  The creation of this Yoder three-tier 
model and its employment will allow for better planning and coordination; likewise, it will 
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Introduction 
I. Backdrop and Purpose: 
Contingency efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and several other countries in the last 
few years have been subjected to close scrutiny and critique.  Contingency Contracting 
operations are increasingly the major source of support and provisioning in forward 
theaters, especially in light of reductions in organic (non-contracted) support 
capabilities. Recently, theater combatant commanders have come to rely on 
contingency contracting officers to support coalition forces, and concurrently, to achieve 
a transformation of the economic landscape essential for achieving theater objectives.  
But, critics of recent operations cite deficiencies in DoD’s ability to effectively and 
efficiently conduct a coordinated contracting support effort that integrates the combatant 
commander’s theater objectives with the myriad stakeholders deemed essential for 
success.  Can we, the military, achieve better results?  The author contends that with 
proper understanding of integrated planning and execution, contingency contracting 
operations can, and will, provide significant leverage for achieving the combatant 
commander’s objectives.   
The author formally presented, on August 7th, 2003, a Yoder three-tier model for 
contingency contracting operations to the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School.3 
Subsequent to the NPS faculty presentation, the author published a synoptic “interest” 
article in the Army AL&T Magazine’s January-February 2004 edition, entitled, 
“Contingency Contracting Operations—Achieving Better Results.4  
Because of continued interest in the Yoder three-tier model expressed by 
academics, force planners, and contracting offices from several agencies, the author 
believes a more comprehensive write-up of the Yoder three-tier model is appropriate.  
                                            
3 E. Cory Yoder, “Contingency Contracting—Achieving Better Results.” NPS slide show, 2003. 
4 E. Cory Yoder, “Contingency Contracting Operations—Achieving Better Results,” Army AL&T Magazine 
PB 70-04-01 (January-February 2004): 95-97.   
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The NPS working paper series provides the in-depth coverage, broad dissemination 
and recognized avenue for open dialogue of the model and its potential efficacy.    
As such, this working paper proposes the Yoder three-tier contingency 
contracting officer model structure for Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force support 
of theater contingency contracting operations.  The creation of this Yoder three-tier 
model and its employment will allow for better planning and coordination; likewise, it will 
allow for better tactical, operational, and theater objective support. 
II. Areas of Focus: 
This working paper is divided into two major sections.  The first section provides 
an overview of the unique contingency contracting requirement. It covers several topics 
vital to understanding why the Yoder three-tier model is appropriate. The second 
section then defines and presents the Yoder three-tier model. This portion provides in-
depth coverage of the three contingency-contracting models proposed by the author.  
As the successful creation and utilization of this conceptual model entails 
contracting, acquisition, personnel planners, and logisticians, the broadest 
dissemination and integration of this Yoder three-tier model is proposed.  
III. Major topical areas addressed include: 
Section One: The unique contingency contracting requirement: 
I. “Contract” definition 
II. Functions of a contract 
III. “Contingency contract” definition 
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Section Two: The Contingency Contracting Officer Yoder three-tier Model: 
I. Calls for better planning and coordination 
II. The Yoder three-tier model for contingency contacting: 
A. Ordering Officer model  
B. Leveraging Contracting Officer model 
C. Integrated Planner and Executor model 
III. Moving from theory to practice—the “who cares” test 
IV. Recommendations and conclusion 
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Section One: The Unique Contingency Contracting 
Requirement 
I. Definition of Contract:  
A contract is nothing more, or less, than a mutually binding legal relationship.  To 




• Execution by Competent Parties, 
• Legality of Purpose, and 
• Clear Terms and Conditions.5 
In the United States, these six elements are derived from the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), State and Federal Law. For DoD Agencies, the concepts are 
manifest through the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and implementing 
regulations and guidance, such as the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFAR).   
While operating within the United States, and, to a large degree, with other 
international systems, contracting officers will find the six elements are nearly 
universally recognized.  However, the contingency contracting officer may also find that 
these universal parameters are subject to varied interpretation; therefore, they may be 
valued as tenets in a significantly different manner than what may be considered 
customary by domestic and developed international standards. 
 
                                            
5 John Cibinic, Jr. and Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Formation of Government Contracts, 3rd ed. (Washington, 
D.C.: The George Washington University Press, 1998), 203-260. 
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II. Contract Functions:   
Contracts perform a variety of functions.  These functions include, but may not be 
limited to, five areas: 
• Evidentiary—a record of the binding agreement, 
• Administrative—delineating terms and conditions, payment processes, 
management, etc., 
• Risk allocation—contract type, monetary and non-monetary incentives, unique 
conditions, 
• Payment—payment criteria and administration, and 
• Motivation—positive and negative.6 
The importance of these functions, especially in the context of the contingency 
contracting environment, cannot be over-emphasized.  
III. “Contingency Operations” defined (statutorily and 
operationally): 
A contingency is an event which requires the deployment of military forces in 
response to natural disasters, terrorist or subversive activities, collapse of law and 
order, political instability, or other military operations.  Contingencies, by nature, require 
plans for rapid response and procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of 
personnel, installations, and equipment. 
There are three types of “disasters” to which the international community 
(including the military) may be called to respond: natural disasters, technological 
disasters, and complex humanitarian emergencies.  According to the United Nations 
Department of Humanitarian Affairs, complex humanitarian emergencies are defined as, 
“a humanitarian crisis in a country or region where there is total or considerable 
                                            
6 Ibid. 203-260  
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breakdown of authority resulting from internal and/or external conflict which requires an 
additional response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency.”7  
Contingencies may exist across the full spectrum of war and during military 
operations other than war (MOOTW).  These could include, but are not limited to: major 
theater wars, small scale contingencies, domestic and international disaster relief, 
peace-keeping operations, nation building, stability operations, and other humanitarian 
operations. 
IV. Declared Contingencies—Effects of Declaration: 
Contingencies may be officially “declared” in accordance with statute.8  In 
accordance with Title 10USC(a)(13), a declared contingency may be: 
• designated by the Secretary of Defense when members of the armed forces may 
become involved in military actions against an enemy of the United States, and/or 
• designated by the President or Congress when members of the uniformed services 
are called on active duty under Title 10 USC, or any provision of law during a 
declared war or national emergency. 
A “non-declared” contingency includes all operations of the Department of 
Defense other than those described under the aforementioned Title 10.  Normally, in the 
international arena, the State Department declares emergencies which may or may not 
require official declaration.   
The distinction between officially-declared and non-declared contingencies is 
significant in its impact on contingency-contracting operations.  Under officially-declared 
contingencies, many provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and most 
service regulations and policies are relaxed, streamlined, or even eliminated, making 
the contracting processes of supporting operations in contingent environments 
potentially more efficient and effective.  
                                            
7 United Nations Dept of Humanitarian Affairs, extracted from the United Nations web-site July 2003.   
8 10 USC (a) (13).  
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Examples of this streamlining include, but are not limited to: 
• Invoking the Defense Production Act/Defense Prioritization and Allocation System 
(DPPS) which requires U.S.-contracted suppliers to place Government contracts at a 
priority over all others, 
• Possible waiver of the unique provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act 
(CICA),  
• Allowance for “extra-ordinary” contract actions under FAR Part 50 (adjustments, 
etc.), and special expediting actions to include the following: 
• Exclusion of synopsis (advertisement) if outside the United States,  
• Utilization of Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP) up to $5 million,  
• Elimination of U.S. socio-economic laws and regulations (outside the U.S.),  
• Award of contracts prior to the resolution of protest actions, and 
• Waiver of over 100 statutes relating to Federal contracting. 
Whether declared or non-declared, contingencies may exist across the full 
spectrum of war and during military operations other than war (MOOTW).  The varying 
degrees of contingencies may include, but are not limited to: major theater wars (Iraqi 
Freedom for example), small-scale contingencies, domestic and international disaster or 
emergency relief, peace-keeping operations, nation building, stability operations, 
extraction and/or evacuation operations, and other humanitarian operations.9 
V. The Nature of Contingent Contracting Environments: 
Contingent contracting environments may be classified as either mature or 
immature.  Mature environments have sophisticated infrastructure capable of supporting 
and sustaining operations.  Generally, mature environments have host-nation support 
agreements, legal frameworks, financial systems able to support complex transactions, 
robust transportation networks, business capacity and capability, and willing 
participants.  Immature environments, in contrast, have little to no supporting 
                                            
9 Joint Publication 01-02. 
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infrastructure.  Immature environments may require grooming to bring the infrastructure 
to desired operational standards, or workarounds (such as bringing a capability into 
theater) to leverage capabilities.   
Most contingencies where military force is required, the “complex humanitarian 
emergencies” as defined by the United Nations, are in immature environments.  In such 
cases, usually a breakdown of leadership and social order negatively impacts host-
nation capabilities, financial systems, transportation systems, business capacity and 
capability, and willingness of potential participants.10  By nature, these immature 
environments, whether immature by nature or by other means, present unique business 
dynamics and challenges to effective and efficient conduct of business.  For instance, 
underground networks for food, shelter, safety and security, and a loss of traditional 
motivators to which many domestic businesses are accustomed may create a 
potentially-difficult situation.  Lack of planning can exacerbate problems and degrade 
mission effectiveness. 
VI. Multi-faceted Operations in Contingent Environments:   
Within the contingent environment, several key functions may be accomplished.  
Among prominent functions are diplomatic negotiations, humanitarian relief, refugee 
support, economic restoration, security and de-weaponization, democratization, and 
provision of essential services for food, shelter, safety, security and medical needs, as 
indicated in Figure 1, below. 
What organizations actually perform these missions?  Not just the military!  Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) are 
vital sources of relief in immature environments as well. The difference between NGOs 
and PVOs is as follows: NGOs are defined by the International Red Cross as non-
governmental, national and international, and constituted apart from the government in 
which they are formed.  Private Volunteer Organizations are defined by the United 
                                            
10 United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, extracted from the United Nations web-site July 
2003.  
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States Agency for International Development (USAID) as tax-exempt, non-profit 
organizations working towards international development, and which receive some 
portion of annual funding from the private sector.   
 











E. Cory Yoder, “Contingency Contracting—Achieving Better Results.” NPS slide show, 2003. 
Generally speaking, most nations prefer the Red Cross definition and, therefore, 
the NGO designator for defining both NGOs and PVOs.   
Several, if not hundreds, of organizations (NGOs and PVOs) may be at work 
within a contingent environment.  The United Nations alone may send the UN 
Department of Human Affairs (UNDHA), the UN High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the UN 
Development Program and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.  Other 
international organizations that may be involved include the World Food Program 
(WFP), the World Health Organization (WHO), and humanitarian organizations such as 
Doctors without Borders.   
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VII. Contingency Contracting Phases (with characteristics): 
Development of the Yoder three-tier contingency contracting model requires an 
understanding of the functions and skill sets to perform successfully.   
There may or may not be a formal Operations Plan or Plans (OPLANs) for a 
given contingency; if not, one should be drafted to include relevant support plans, 
concept of operations, liaison requirements, and security plans.  Surprisingly, the 
overarching OPLAN for Operation Iraqi Freedom did NOT include contracting plans in 
sufficient detail to provide any meaningful concept of operations or direction to 
contingency contracting support personnel.11 
Four phases of major operations are adapted from joint publication doctrine for 
analytical purposes.  Understanding the nature of contracted support during the four 
phases is imperative for defining the functional requirements of any manning model 
designed to support those functions. 
A. Phase I: Mobilization and Initial Deployment: 
• initial 30-45 days of operations 
• main emphasis on basic life support and security items, including the creation or 
establishment of: 




 fuel  
 sanitation 
 interpreters and guides, and 
 security 
                                            
11 Mike Anderson and Greg Flaherty, Analysis of the Contingency Contracting Support Plan within the 
Joint Planning Process Framework. (Monterey: NPS, 2003). 
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 11- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
• Liaison with host nation, USAID, local politicians, etc. 
B. Phase II: Build-Up and Stabilization: 
• commences after Phase I, normally day 45+ 
• continued priority for basic life support and security items, with additional priority for: 
 construction and infrastructure 
 habitability 
 “quality of life” items (sports, canteens, etc.) 
 establishment of a solid and reliable vendor base 
 contracting control and administration 
 normally, shift from a “push” to a “pull” support strategy 
 greater numbers of mission personnel supported by the contingency contractor 
C. Phase III: Sustainment (Post-buildup until Termination): 
Phase III may be considered the long-haul event. The duration may range from 
weeks to months or years, and may become stabilized to the point of resembling a 
state-side base operation.  Contingency contracting operations are robust and 
standardized, and include the following:  
• continued priority for basic life support and security items 
• all aspects of Phases I and II, with the addition of: 
 establishing Indefinite Delivery type contracts, Blanket Purchase Agreements 
(BPAs), etc. 
 improving and refining internal controls 
 increasing competition in vendor base 
 utilizing “pull” contracts for services not available in that particular theater 
 planning and contracting for termination of operations 
 creating “dormant” contracts for contingent or “extra-ordinary” events 
 
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 12- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
D. Phase IV: Termination and Redeployment:  
Phase IV continues all of Phases I, II and III, but shifts emphasis to those 
functions required to terminate operations in an orderly and expeditious manner.  This is 
a particularly challenging phase of operations.  There must be a clearly defined “end-
state” in order for planners and executors to know how best to organize and execute 
functions.  Phase IV functions include the continued emphasis and requirement for: 
• continued priority for life support and security items 
• phasing-out earlier priorities with a shift towards: 
 packing and freight services 
 transportation 
 contract termination 
 contract closeout 
 securing audit and accountability prior to exit 
 complementing the overall exit strategy 
Identifying a clear and orderly end-state and hand-off to other players, whether 
those players are the host nation or other agencies including NGOs and PVOs, may be 
characterized by a return of security, a stabilized economy, and NGOs and PVOs at 
liberty to exercise their operations and functions.  Certainly, less orderly hand-offs have 
occurred in recent years, including the Somalia situation (Black Hawk Down scenario) 
where an ambiguous end-state was the result of unclear mission requirements and little 
effective military coordination with NGO and PVO players. 
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Section Two: The Yoder Contingency Contracting 
Yoder Three-tier Model   
I. Calls for better planning and coordination: 
Several notable calls for better planning, coordination and integration of 
contracting operations with broader theater-support elements—with intent to more 
efficiently and effectively accomplish theater objectives—have been postulated.  A few 
of the more prominent calls for better planning and integration include, but are certainly 
not limited to: first, the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 entitled, “Managing 
Complex Contingency Operations”; Rand Report on Civil and Military Cooperation; and 
several Naval Postgraduate School thesis projects including two supervised and 
advised by this author.12,13 
PDD 56 was issued by President Clinton in 1997.  This directive determines the 
integration of planning and execution among Federal Agencies called to perform in 
contingencies. The problem with PDD 56 is two-fold.  First, PDD 56 is not embraced by 
the current administration.  Second, PDD 56 does not apply to combat operations 
(where the use of military force is required, including peace-keeping and stabilization).   
The Rand Report entitled Civilians and Soldiers—Achieving Better Coordination 
proposed greater integration, and identified stakeholders in contingent operations.14  
 
                                            
12 John Coombs, Lessons for Contingency Contracting—Humanitarian Organizations in Uzbekistan 
(Monterey: NPS, 2004). 
13 Mike Anderson and Greg Flaherty, Analysis of the Contingency Contracting Support Plan within the 
Joint Planning Process Framework (Monterey: NPS, 2003). 
14 Bruce R Pirnie, Civilians and Soldiers—Achieving Better Coordination (Rand Corporation, 1998). 
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II. The Yoder Three-tier Model for Contingency Contracting 
Operations: 
The author proposes three models of employment for contingency contracting 
officers.  Each tier performs unique functions, requires specific education, developed 
skill sets, and unique personnel and manpower characteristics.  Each tier is co-
dependent, or integrated in hierarchal manner, on the other tiers.  The Yoder three-tier 
model maximizes effectiveness and efficiency of theater contingency contracting 
operations, and directly links operations to Combatant Commander (COCOM) broad 
objectives through integrative planning and execution. (See Figure 2 on page 16.) 
A. Ordering Officer Model.  The most basic and simplistic model is the 
“ordering officer” model.  This is the most rudimentary of contracting support, which 
includes functions such as placing orders against existing theater contracts.  By nature, 
this requires little interactive engagement in the environment, and is best suited for 
warranted junior officers and enlisted personnel.   
B. Leveraging Contracting Officer (LCO) Model.  The next higher-level model 
is the “leveraging contracting officer” model.  This level includes the basic ordering 
functions of the ordering officer model, but includes leveraging the capacities and 
capabilities of the local and regional economies in the contingent theater.  As such, 
there may be a reduced need for organic service and material support.  The practitioner 
in the leveraging model clearly will be engaged in interfacing with local and regional 
businesses, creating business processes, and potentially coordinating with higher 
military, Non Governmental Organizations and Private Volunteer Organizations 
NGO/PVO and political organizations.  With this in mind, only higher-level, more 
qualified and capable practitioners should perform in the leverage model.  A shortfall of 
this model is that the CCO (Contingency Contracting Officer) operation may or may not 
be integrated with the broader goals of national and theater objectives.  In the worst 
case, some of the tactical execution may actually be counter to those higher-level goals.   
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C. The Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) Model.  The highest-level model 
is the “Integrated Planner and Executor” (IPE) contingency contracting officer.  This 
model takes the leveraging contracting officer function one giant step forward.  In this 
model, well-educated and qualified CCOs are integrated into the operational-planning 
phases of contingencies, often before actual troop deployment; they then make the 
transition to operations.  The hallmark of the IPE CCO is that contingency contracting 
operations may be planned and subsequently executed to meet National Strategic and 
theater objectives.  Additionally, the myriad NGOs and PVOs—which, in many if not 
most cases, are essential to the overall efficiency, effectiveness, and, ultimately, the 
success of operations—can be integrated into the planning and execution of 
contingency operations.  While this integration requirement may seem painfully obvious, 
the integrated planning and execution among warfighters, contingent contracting 
officers, and the NGOs and PVOs is not, and does not occur on a regular and recurring 
basis.15   
The author proposes that Integrated Planner and Executor CCO (IPE CCO) be 
utilized in a broader planning-and-execution environment.  The Contingency Contracting 
Officer, with higher-level certification, education and experience, should be integrated 
within J-4 and J-5 Logistics and Planning/Operations and Exercise organization 
structure.  Integration is essential to achieve desired synergies between the myriad 
organizations involved in and participating in contingency environments.  Concurrently, 
operational planners can leverage integration of all theater players (military, 
NGOs/PVOs, and contractors) to achieve harmony between National Security Strategy 
(NSS), Combatant Commander (COCOM), and significant NGOs’ and PVOs’ 
objectives, through integrated planning, exercising, and, ultimately, execution.  This 
integrative planning, exercising, and execution may: help in eliminating competing (and 
often conflicting) demands of the participants, closely marry acquisition support with 
stated objectives, allow for the creation of robust Contingency Contract Support Plans, 
and integrate such plans into broader operational plans in support of theater operations.  
                                            
15 The author recommends NPS thesis by Anderson and Flaherty. 
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The higher-order IPE calls for the most highly-educated and seasoned planners and 
operational/theater-level planners. Figure 2 highlights the integrative functions among 
stakeholders that are a hallmark of the IPE.   The Yoder Three-tier models described 
herein are summarized in Table 1, presented on page 17.  
Figure 2. Integrated Planner and Executor Model 
 
E. Cory Yoder, “Contingency Contracting—Achieving Better Results.” NPS slide show, 2003.16 
                                            
16 S.W.O.T. is Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunity, and Threat. S.W.O.T is a methodological model for 
analysis of strategic requirements, found in several management forums, originally presented to the 
author by Dr. Nancy Roberts, NPS. 
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Table 1. Yoder Three-tier Model for Contingency Contracting Operations 
Model Tier Level & Model Title Functions/Education/Rank Highlights and Drawbacks 
Ordering Officer—Tier One 
• basic ordering 
• some simplified 
acquisitions 
• training: DAU CON 234 
• DAWIA Certified CON 
Level I or II 
• junior to mid-enlisted, 
junior officers, GS-7 to GS-
9 1102 series civilians 
• simple buys 
• little integration 
• no operational planning 




• leverages to local 
economy 
• reduces “pushed” material 
support 
• training/education: 
• DAU CON 234,      
recommended higher 
education 
• DAWIA Certified CON   
Level II or III 
• senior enlisted, junior to 
mid-grade officers, GS-11+ 
1102 series civilians 
• better local operational 
planning 
• some integration 
• more capability for the 
operational commander 
• no planned theater 
integration 
• no broad liaison functions 
• may perform to optimize 
local operations at the 
detriment to theater ops 
Integrated Planner and 
Executor (IPE)—Tier Three 
• highest level of planning 
and integration—joint 
• linked/integrated with J-4 
and J-5  
• creates and executes 
OPLAN CCO strategy 
• provides direction to tier 
two and one 
• links operations 
strategically to theater 
objectives of COCOM 
• education: Master’s degree 
or higher and, JPME 
Phase I and II  
• DAWIA Certified CON 
Level III, and other DAWIA 
disciplines (LOG, ACQ, 
FIN, etc) 
• senior officers (0-6+), 
senior civilians, GS-13+ or 
SES 
• performs operational and 
theater analysis, integrates 
results into OPLAN 
• link between COCOM and 
OPLAN to all theater 
contracting operations 
• coordinates theater 
objectives with best 
approach to contracted 
support 
• can achieve broader 
national security goals 
through effective 
distribution of national 
assets 
• includes planning, 
communication, 
coordination, and 
exercising with NGO and 
PVO in theater 
E. Cory Yoder, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004.  
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III. Moving from Theory to Practice—the “Who Cares” Test. 
What organizations might benefit from integration of planning and execution of 
contingency contracting with broader operational and theater planning?   
First, Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) would benefit. These soldiers are 
generally interested in getting in theater, accomplishing the mission, and getting out!  
The premise is that without integration, they are not effectively or efficiently utilizing all 
players and assets capable of providing leverage for their mission achievement. Clearly, 
they can benefit from integration. 
Second, the Joint J-4 and J-5 staffs, which have traditionally focused on 
”logistics” rather than integrative contracting and logistics, can better achieve logistical 
support through integration of all theater assets, including contracting.   
Third, personnel planners and assigners have a stake in the model.  The 
integrative planner and executor CCO (IPE CCO) inherently demands highly-educated 
and experienced personnel to fully integrate effectively into the higher-level planning 
organizations.  The IPE CCO could clearly benefit from Master’s-level education in at 
least one specialty, such as Contracting, and concurrently with JPME Phase I and II.  
This level of qualification is undoubtedly not for everyone.  Creating the ICE CCO 
position within organizations will have a significant impact on the personnel pipeline, 
including the requirement for higher education, joint qualification, and significant 
practitioner experience in the joint environment.   
Fourth, NGOs and PVOs would benefit from the ICE CCO model.  These 
organizations could develop a better understanding and dialogue with their military 
counterparts—something that is currently lacking.  NGOs and PVOs are sensitive and 
dedicated to maintaining a perception and often the reality of being wholly detached 
from a particular government or military.  Any close association could damage their 
“neutrality” and adversely affect their ability to deliver services and supplies.  However, 
they are often inescapably dependent on the military to provide the secure framework, 
logistics support, and contracting for the conduct of their business.  Meshing, or creating 
harmony of operations, may be a better moniker than integration.  Nonetheless, national 
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strategic objectives, theater, and operational objectives of both the military and the 
NGOs and PVOs require coordination to achieve maximum synergies and the desired 
efficiencies and effectiveness to meet the collective end-state.   
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Section Three: Recommendations and Conclusions: 
The Yoder three-tier model addresses a significant shortfall in current 
contingency contracting operation support: integrative planning and execution.  As is 
demonstrated in the Anderson and Flaherty project, comprehensive planning in the joint 
environs of the Combatant Commander’s J-4 (logistics) and J-5 (planning and 
exercising) is currently not being accomplished to any significant degree17.  Instead, 
what the acquisition and contracting community is providing the COCOM is a sub-
optimized, ad hoc approach to providing contracted theater support.  
The Yoder three-tier model calls for the cultivation and utilization of senior 
officers and civilians with sufficient education, joint qualification, multi-discipline Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certifications and other professional 
qualifications to perform at the highest integrative-planning and execution levels.  At the 
highest level, the Integrative Planner and Executor (IPE) is the essential and critical 
linch-pin allowing for the development of a comprehensive Contingency Contracting 
Support Plan (CCSP) that integrates contracting with the broader theater objectives in 
the Operation Plan (OPLAN).  
The IPE, being integrated at the J-4 level, will plan, exercise, and call for 
adequate theater contingency contracting personnel provisioning (which may vary 
depending on the phases of the contingency operation) to effectively and efficiently 
meet theater objectives.   
The primary recommendation is that the Yoder three-tier model be reviewed and 
implemented across all services.  In order to effectively accomplish this, the author 
recommends that senior leadership, including at the secretariat level, take pro-active 
measures to implement the model.  Such review and implementation considerations 
include the following (secondary/implementation recommendations): 
                                            
17 Mike Anderson and Greg Flaherty, Analysis of the Contingency Contracting Support Plan within the 
Joint Planning Process Framework (Monterey: NPS, 2003). 
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• Mandate service implementation of the Yoder three-tier model, 
• Fully fund educational and career-development programs which are the hallmark of 
the Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) and the Leveraging Contracting Officer 
(LCO),18    
• Ensure the services create career incentives for personnel choosing to take 
positions in support of the Yoder three-tier structure, 
• Mandate that the J-4 structure include the IPE, top-level integrative planner and 
executor, and 
• Mandate Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phases I and II for personnel 
at the IPE and LCO model levels. 
With increasing demands placed on the contracting community to provide service 
and theater support, it is imperative that the structures called upon to provide this 
assistance are effectively designed and staffed to accomplish optimized reinforcement 
of theater (COCOM) objectives.  It is nearly impossible to believe, in any way, that the 
reactive, ad hoc manner in which theater contracting support is being conducted creates 
such optimal support.  The fact is that little to no contracting planning and tiered 
execution is conducted.  Embracing and implementing the Yoder three-tier model will 
allow the best structure possible to achieve the synergies necessary to accomplish 
today’s and tomorrow’s theater objectives. 
It’s time to create better planning, execution, and integrated contingency 
contracting operations! 
 
                                            
18  The Naval Postgraduate School has several career-enhancing master’s degrees in fields specifically 
designed for upwardly-mobile acquisition and contracting officers and civilians. 
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